Stone: Mexican Agrarian Rights: Who Do They Benefit?

MEXICAN AGRARIAN RIGHTS:
WHO DO THEY BENEFIT?
Newspaper headlines recently reported that Mexican farm workers had taken and moved onto private land. Within hours after this
takeover, a presidential decree granted the land to the occupiers. ' Even
though land expropriations have taken place regularly during the last
sixty years, this report created tremendous concern and interest as
more land seizures occurred. 2 The land seizures, occurring only two
and a half months after an extensive devaluation of the Mexican peso,
focused attention on the precarious economic condition of farm workers and the critical difficulties facing the central government of M6xico.3 This crisis reflected the basic philosophy of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and its inherent contradictions in the conflict between the
distribution of land to landless workers and the protection of private
agricultural land.4 The impact of the industrial and agricultural policies
of President Echeverria (1970-76) significantly sharpened this
contradiction.
Since 1915, agricultural policy has focused predominantly on the
restoration and distribution of land to farm workers. 5 The ejido6 has
1.
2.
3.
4.

Los Angeles Times, Nov. 20, 1976, § I, at 13, col. I.
Los Angeles Times, Nov. 30, 1976, § I, at 10, col. I.
Los Angeles Times, Sept. 10, 1976, § I, at I, col. 1.
L. PADGETT, THE MEXICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 39 (1966) [hereinafter cited as

PADGETT, POLITICAL SYSTEM].
5.

G. HUIZER, PEASANT ORGANIZATION IN THE PROCESS OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN

MEXICO 141 (1969) [hereinafter cited as HUIZER]. The following chart demonstrates land
distributions made by eleven presidents from 1915 to 1959. Note that the first president
to complete his six-year term of office since the Mexican Revolution is Lazaro Cirdenas, who distributed the greatest quantity of hectares. One hectare is equivalent to
2.48 acres.

Years
1915-1920

Venustiano Carranza

Hectares
224,393

1920-1921

Adolfo de la Huerta

157,532

1921-1925
1925-1929
1929-1930
1930-1933
1933-1935
1935-1941
1941-1947
1947-1953
1953-1959

Alvaro Obreg6n
P. Elias Calles
Emilio Portes Gil
Pascual Ortiz Rubio
Abelardo Rodriguez
Lizaro Cfrdenas
M. Avila Camacho
Miguel Alemdn
A. Ruiz Cortinez

1,677,057
3,195,028
2,065,847
1,203,737
2,094,637
20,072,957
5,327,942
4,057,933
3,664,379
total

43,741,512

6. The word ejido is a descendant of the Latin verb exire, "to go out". In Spain
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been the basic mechanism to effectuate land distribution. It must be
emphasized, however, that the ejido is not the land itself, but is the
community formed by the beneficiaries, the ejidatarios.7 The ejido is
more than a legal and economic entity. 8 It is the symbol of Mexican
democracy and liberty within the context of social justice.' The ejido
boldly states "M6xico for the Mexicans" and "land for the peasants".° The ejido remains basic to the Mexican Revolution not only
as evidence of land distribution, but because it gives indispensable
political support to the government and gives continuity to the revolutionary outlook in governmental and social institutions."1
To understand the current conditions in M6xico, it is necessary to
examine the nation's institutions and policies, to trace their growth and
development, and to assess the effect that the Echeverrian administration will have on the future of M6xico. Because the future of M6xico,
as a developing country, is inextricably tied to its land and the welfare
of its farm workers,12 the political, economic, and social developments
will be measured in this Comment against the ejido and agricultural
policies. Attention will be focused first on the early days of the
Revolution up to 1934, when President L6.zaro Cirdenas took office. 1 3
This second period was prophetic, for the radical activities of the
Cirdenas administration appear to parallel the policies of President
the term was applied originally to the uncultivated lands lying on the outskirts of a rural
village. These lands were held collectively. In present-day M6xico the word is used in
connection with lands granted to villages under the agrarian reform, and is sometimes
extended to the village itself. Thompson, Land for Peons-AgrarianReform in Mixico,
in THE EVOLUTION OF LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 562 (A. Christensen ed. 1951)

[hereinafter cited as Thompson].
7. Karst, Legal Institutions and Development: Lessons from the Mexican Ejido,
16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 282 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Karst]. The ejido as a communal
agrarian institution was a uniquely designed mechanism to place the land in the hands of
the farm worker. For the purpose of protecting him from losing the land, it devised an
elaborate paternalistic structure to oversee its functions. See note 45 infra.
8. H. NAVARRO BOLANDI, LA REVOLUCION MEXICANA Y SU PROCESO EVOLUTIVO
307 (Mex. 1969) [hereinafter cited as NAVARRO BOLANDI].

9. Padgett, Mexico's One-PartySystem: A Re-Evaluation, 51 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
1006 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Padgett, One-Party System].
10. Constitution of Mexico (Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos) art. 27, § I, as amended [O.A.S. trans. 1972] [hereinafter cited as MEX.
CONST.].

Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies have the right
to acquire ownership of lands, waters, and their appurtenances, or to obtain
concessions for the exploitation of mines or of waters.
11. Padgett, One-Party System, supra note 9, at 996, 1001.
12. Thompson, supra note 6, at 561.
13. Id. at 564. This short article is an excellent exposition of Lizaro Cirdenas, who
was president from 1934 to 1940.
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Echeverria. Following an investigation of the first two revolutionary
eras, a study of the third period from 1940 to 1970 will be made. This
span of thirty years involved growth and consolidation of the fruits of
the Revolution. The last and most recent period to be investigated
concentrates on President Echeverria's agricultural and economic
policies during his term of office which started in 1970 and ended
November 30, 1976. This period exemplifies the conflict between
basic revolutionary tenets and the inherent contradictions in their
application.
I.

FORMULATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PHILOSOPHY

Before attempting to study the conflicts of the Echeverrian
period, a firm grasp of the revolutionary philosophy that underlines
Mexican land reform is required. The Mexican Revolution started in
1910 with the overthrow of President Porfirio Diaz. First elected in
1876 under a no-reelection platform, Diaz held office eight times,
seven of which were consecutive terms. 14 Under his administration,
the development of Mexico was primarily centered around foreign
investors in mineral resources, construction of railroads to transport
these resources, and continued expansion of large estates owned by
Mexican, Spanish, German, English, and United States citizens, individually or as corporations. 15
The War of Reform of 185716 and the Law of Reform 17 were
designed to protect and insure the continued existence of the indigent
population by allowing for individual parcelization of communal
land. 18 Instead, wholesale confiscations of Indian communal lands
were carried out through the legal trickery of Diaz's supporters. 19 As a
result, the peasants found themselves trapped in a system barely
distinguishable from serfdom20 in which the farm worker, by purchas14.

E. BOLTON, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAS 341 (1935).

15. Thompson, supra note 6, at 366-69.
16. The War of Reform (1857-60) was fought to vindicate the social revolutionary
Constitution of 1857, led by President Benito Jurez, a full-blooded Indian who learned
to read and speak Spanish while in his teens. He is often compared to Abraham Lincoln
as the liberator of his people. Dozer, Roots of Revolution in Latin America, in THE
EVOLUTION OF LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 303 (A. Christensen ed. 1951). See also
PADGETr, POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 17.
17. NAVARRO BOLANDI, supra note 8, at 306.
18. Id.
19.
20.

L. DUGGAN, THE AMERICAS, 13 (1949).
P. FRIEDRICH, AGRARIAN REVOLT IN A MEXICAN VILLAGE 4 (1970) [hereinafter

cited as Friedrich].
[B]etween 1883 and 1910, over 27 per cent of the total area of the Republic [of
Mexico] was conveyed to private companies. Twelve states were left with no
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ing the necessities of life from the landowner's stores,
surrendered his independence. 2 ' Underlying the political
confusion of the Mexican Revolution, was the peasants'
implacable demand for land. The need to provide
for a
22
solution for the destitute farmers was apparent.

effectively
and social
urgent and
permanent

With battles raging in the countryside, Luis Cabrera wrote the
Law of Grants and Restitutions. 23 The decree was issued officially on
January 6, 1915, by Provisional President Venustiano Carranza. It
categorically declared null and illegal all acts of division and alienation
of communal and tribal lands, waters and forests subsequent to 1856.24
The restitution and distribution of land was the cause and the result of
the Revolution. In order to expedite this restoration, the decree provided for a National Agrarian Commission to supervise the process and
to set up various state and regional agrarian commissions not only to
receive petitions but to act upon them as well .25
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 191726 continued this
approach, but specifically added that the national territory originally
belonged to the nation and only the nation had the power to transfer
dominion over national land.2 7 The article extended the concept of
public ownership by requiring that expropriations be effected only for
"public lands" at all. By 1910, 14,000,000 Mexican peasants, many of them
Indians, were trapped in a system of hired labor and peonage that often differed
little from serfdom. By 1911, 95 percent of all rural families in all but five states
were landless. The landless peasants had become a rural laboring class for some
20,000 landholders of mestizo and foreign extraction. Over 90 percent of
Mexico's best land was effectively controlled by less than five percent of the
population. . . . Beneath the political slogans and the social confusion of the
Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) there surged the peasants' urgent and implacable demand: la tierra.
21. PADGETT, POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 187.
22. FRIEDRICH, supra note 20, at 4.
23. NAVARRO BOLANDI, supra note 8, at 306.

24. Id. at 309-11.
25. Id..at 306.
26. MEX. CONST., art. 27, reads in part:

Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public use
and subject to payment of indemnity.
The nation shall at all times have the right to impose on private property
such limitations as the public interest may demand, as well as the right to
regulate the utilization of natural resources which are susceptible of appropriation, in order to conserve them and to ensure a more equitable distribution of
public wealth. With this end in view, necessary measures shall be taken to
divide up large landed estates; to develop small landed holdings in operation; to
create new agricultural centers, with necessary lands and waters; to encourage
agriculture in general and to prevent the destruction of natural resources, and to
protect property from damage to the detriment of society. Centers of population which at present either have no lands or water or which do not possess
them in sufficient quantities for the needs of their inhabitants, shall be entitled
to grants thereof, which shall be taken from adjacent properties, the rights of
small landed holdings in operation being respected at all times.
27. Id.
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public utility and through indemnification. Additionally, it provided
that the nation has the right to impose such methods as the public
interest dictates. 28 The basis for payment of the expropriated property
29
was the declared value for land tax purposes, plus ten percent.
Article 27 gives the President of the Republic all necessary
powers to formulate and determine the institutions of land tenure, its
forms and its financial support . 30 The concepts of national ownership
of land, restoration of communal and tribal land to the community,
expropriation based on public utility, and limitations on private ownership, remain basic to the revolutionary and constitutional philosophy. 31 The President, under the Law of Agrarian Reform, has all the
powers to achieve these goals and absolute authority in all agrarian
matters. 32
A.

Controversy Over Land Distribution

These presidential powers granted by article 27 of the Mexican
Constitution and the Land Reform Laws did not put an end to the
conflict and unrest in the countryside. 3 3 The demand for food and land
compelled President Adolfo de la Huerta3 4 to issue a decree on June
23, 1920, entitled the Law on Idle Lands. 35 The decree specified the
conditions under which idle land was to be cultivated by the nonowner
36
peasants and how the land would be returned once harvested.
The first major revision of this decree was a limitation proclaimed
by President Alvaro Obreg6n on August 2, 1923. 37 By decree, he
28. Id.
29. Thompson, supra note 6, at 568. Land owners were offered 20-year, five
percent bonds in payment. Service on the bonds was not kept up and within a few years
they dropped to one-tenth of their value.
30. MEX. CONST., art. 27 pertains to land tenure; art. 73 pertains to national
monetary and credit policies.
31. The New Agrarian Reform Law, (Nueva Ley de Reforma Agaria) (Editorial
Libro-Mex., Mexico 1976) [hereinafter cited as Law of Agrarian Reform].
32. Id. art. 8.
33.

PADGETr, POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 23-26.

34. Id. at 23. President Adolfo de la Huerta is to be distinguished from General
Victoriano Huertd, who made himself president after the imprisonment and eventual
assassination of President Francisco I. Madero, the leader of the anti-Diaz revolutionary
faction.
35. Law of Idle Lands, (Ley de Tierras Ociosas) in Official Daily of M6xico (Diario
Oficial)June 23, 1920, in New Law of Agrarian Reform (Nueva Ley de Reforma Agraria)
(Editorial Libro-Mex, M6xico, 1976).
36. Id. art. 7-15. The first codification of the Law of Agrarian Reform was in
1934.
37. Decree of August 2, 1923, Entitling Every Mexican of Eighteen Years of Age to
the Acquisition of National or Idle Lands (DecretoDe 2 De Agosto De 1923, Facultando
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excepted such land that the government may reserve for colonization,
forestry or other uses according to express laws.3 8 Political instability
continued in the aftermath of the revolution as evidenced by the
inability of elected or appointed presidents to complete their six-year
term of office.3 9 Land distribution was affected similarly. Land expropriation and distribution and grants of agrarian rights to peasants
were subjected to the vagaries of each president's philosophy and the
40
prevailing political climate.
By 1930, there existed a distinct probability that the demand for
land 4' could be satisfied. The total population numbered 16,296,000 in
192942 and nearly 14,600,000 hectares was considered to be cropland
suitable for cultivation. 43 Despite the recent and protracted armed
rebellion, land distribution and the creation of ejidos was at the center
of controversy and continues to the present time.
A Todo Mexicano Mayor de Dieciocho Ahios Para La Adquisici6n De Tierras Nacionales
o Baldias) in Official Daily of M6xico (Diario Oficial) Aug. 11, 1923 in New Law of
Agrarian Reform (Nueva Ley de Reforma Agraria) (Editorial Libro-Mex., Mexico,
1976).
38. Id. art. 1.
39. See note 5 for the time each president actually served despite the six-year
constitutional term of office.
40. PADGE'T, POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 188-92.
41. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MEXICO & ADVERTISING COUNCIL, INC., ROUND
TABLE ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT (Mxico, 1965). The land in Mexico is extremely
irregular and mountainous. It encompasses 200,000,000 hectares, 75% mountains, 8%
level and 17% rolling. The availability of water is crucial to its utility. Of the total,
150,000,000 hectares are considered agricultural of which 90,000,000 hectares are designated for pasture, 30,000,000 hectares are forested and 20,000,000 hectares are suitable
for seasonal and permanent crops. The remaining 50,000,000 hectares are considered
desert.
42. Perez L6pez, The National Product of Mixico: 1895 to 1964, in MEXICO'S
RECENT ECONOMIC GROWTH 27 (M. Urquidi trans. 1967) [hereinafter cited as P6rez
L6pez].
43. R. HANSEN, THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN DEVELOPMENT 34 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as HANSEN]. The following chart demonstrates the expansion of cultivated cropland from 1930 to 1960. Note the reduction in the percentage of ejido cropland as the
amount designated cropland increases.
DISTRIBUTION OF CROPLAND AND CULTIVATED LAND
Land Category

1930

1940

1950

1960

Total Cropland
(in million of hectares)

14.6

14.9

19.9

23.8

Ejido cropland
(% of total)

13

47

44

43

Total Land Cultivated
(in millions of hectares)

7.3

10.9

13.8

49

47

Ejido Land Cultivated
(% of total)

15

7.9
49
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One important factor that has contributed to this controversy has
been the lack of individual title certificates. Approximately five percent of all ejidos" have titles describing the ejidatario'sland and his
specific entitlement to work the land. In about ten percent of the
ejidos, a final decision by the national government to grant the land to
45
the ejido was not made.
Because most of the ejidos have a general unsurveyed title certificate, boundary disputes frequently arise among the owners of "small
property" 46 and other landholdings of varying sizes. Not only boundary line and title controversies, but disputes over water allocation
among all three types of landholders have continued to create protracted conflict. 47 Compounding this problem and making title-tracing
44. The ejido is not the land; it is the community formed by the ejidatarios. Karst,
supra note 7, at 282. The ejido has the right to hold legal title to the land, but this right is
only to its use. Ejido land is inalienable and cannot be mortgaged. Law of Agrarian
Reform, supra note 31, art. 52 provides:
The rights that the centers of population acquire over agrarian land shall be
inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, nontransferable and they will not,
under any circumstance or in any form, alienate, deed, transfer, rent or lease,
mortgage, or encumber, in whole or in part. Such acts, contracts or operations
that shall be executed or that, under pretense of abiding by this section, be
contrary to it are declared nonexistent.
Translation provided by the author.
45. Karst, supra note 7, at 293. The ejidatarios lead a precarious, insecure existence. The cacique is the leader and political boss who is, by default, in charge of
granting, transfering or denying a grant to an eligible worker. The cacique often grants
such entitlement to his own friends. The practice of renting or leasing, though forbidden,
is widespread. Many ejidatarios and their children work in the major cities due to the
underemployment of agricultural workers.
46. "Small property" is defined in the Constitution, art. 27, § 15, as follows:
Small agricultural property is that which does not exceed one hundred
hectares of first-class moist or irrigated land or its equivalent in other classes of
land, under cultivation.
To determine this equivalence one hectare of irrigated land shall be
computed as two hectares of seasonal land; as four of good quality pasturage
(agostadero) and as eight as monte (scrub land) or arid pasturage.
Also to be considered as small holdings are areas not exceeding two
hundred hectares of seasonal lands or pasturage susceptible of cultivation; or
one hundred fifty hectares of land used for cotton growing if irrigated from
fluvial canals or by pumping; or three hundred, under cultivation, when used
for growing bananas, sugar cane, coffee, henequen, rubber, coconuts, grapes,
olives, quinine, vanilla, cacao, or fruit trees.
Small holdings for stockraising are lands not exceeding the area necessary
to maintain up to five hundred head of cattle (ganado major) or their equivalent
in smaller animals (ganado menor-sheep, goats, pigs,) under provisions of law,
in accordance with the forage capacity of the lands.
Whenever, due to irrigation or drainage works or any other works executed
by the owners or occupants of a small holding to whom a certificate of nonaffectability has been issued, the quality of the land is improved for agricultural
or stockraising operations, such holding shall not be subject to agrarian appropriations even if, by virtue of the improvements made, the maximums indicated
in this section are lowered, provided that the requirements fixed by law are met.
47. Padgett, One-Party System, supra note 9, at 1001.
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impossible are the original presidential decrees. 48 Various reports have
sought to reconcile the earlier grants, but there are wide discrepancies
regarding the total number of hectares, the
number of ejidatarios and
49
the quantity of hectares for each family .
An even sharper area of controversy has centered around the role
of the ejido. By mid-1933, a sharp division of opinion had developed
between two groups of Mexican leaders regarding the program and
goals of agrarian reform. 50 The veteranos charged that the ejido had
not lived up to expectations. 51 As a system of collective or communal
holding, the ejido was declared to be economically inefficient and the
plots assigned were thought to be too small for cultivation by modern
48. HUIZER, supra note 5, at 141. This chart demonstrates the differences that arise
from using different sources. Compare Mr. Huizer's chart in note 5. Both charts are
from the same source, yet they credit each president with a different total. It is
exceedingly difficult to resolve boundary line and title controversies with defects in the
original grants.

Year

Total
hectares
distributed

Number
of
ejidatarios

Average
area per
ejidatario

1915-20
1921-24
1925-28
1929
1930-32
1933-34
1935-40
1941-46
1947-52
1953-58
total

172,997
1,556,983
3,045,802
1,749,583
1,520,139
1,924,149
17,609,139
3,335,575
3,998,807
3,198,780
38,111,954

46,050
161,788
301,587
126,317
192,690
158,139
771,640
114,571
73,041
250,222
2,196,045

3.8
9.6
10.0
18.8
10.2
12.8
22.9
29.1
54.7
12.7
17.3

49. HANSEN, supra note 43, at 34. When comparing this chart with the charts supra
note 5 and 48 the differences become more pronounced. Note the differences in total
hectares distributed, differences in number of ejidatarios benefited and the average area
per ejidatario.
Recipients of Land by Presidental term since 1915
End of
Term
(year)
1920
1920
1924
1928
1930
1932
1934
1940
1946
1952
1958
1964

President
Carranza
De La Huerta
Obregon
Calles
Portes Gil
Ortiz Rubio
Rodriguez
Cardenas
A. Camacho
M. Aleman
Ruiz Cortinez
Lopez Mateos

Recipients
Average
Number
Hectares
46,398
3.6
6,330
5.3
128,568
8.6
297,428
10.6
171,577
10.0
64,573
14.6
68,556
11.5
811,157
22.1
157,536
37.7
97,391
49.7
231,888
21.1
304,498
37.3

Cumulative
Number of
Recipients
46,398
52,728
181,196
478,624
650,201
714,774
783,330
1,594,487
1,752,023
1,849,414
2,081,302
2,385,800

50. Thompson, supra note 6, at 562.
51. Id.
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methods.52 It was argued further that the ejido should be considered a
transitory form of agricultural organization.5 3 Their opponents, the
agraristas, demanded that complete socialization of the land be regarded as permanent and recognized as a new social and economic
54
organization of agricultural life.
Two events in December, 1933, clearly turned the balance in favor of the agraristas. The first complete agrarian code was put into
effect by President Rodriguez and, except for article 27 of the
Constitution, the code has remained the most important statement of
the goals and procedures regarding agrarian reform. 55 Moreover, during that same month, the Revolutionary Party chose Lizaro Ci.rdenas
as their candidate for president. 5 6 The critical issue was whether the
agrarian programs would be founded upon the concept of small prop7
erty purchased by the peasantry, or upon the idea of the ejido.1
II.

CARDENAS' POLICIES SHAPE THE FUTURE OF MEXICO

The idea of the ejido truimphed with the election of Cirdenas.
The ejido became the vehicle to provide the economic independence
5
and civil liberty promised to the peasants by the Mexican Revolution . 1
52. Id. at 563.
53. Id.
54. Id.
PADGET, POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 191.
56. Id. at 192.
57. Id.
58. Thompson, supra note 6, at 564. This short article is an excellent exposition of
Lizaro Cdrdenas, President during 1934-40. Thompson quotes the following speech
Cirdenas delivered in the city of Torre6n on November 30, 1936.
In the early stages of the Revolution there may possibly have been some people
in whose mind the ejido was but a mere supplement to the wage-earning system
and insufficient in itself to guarantee the land laborer the economic independence that is the foundation of every civil liberty. But this view exerts no
influence whatsoever on the fulfillment of the duties of the Government today.
Groups of peasants were in the past given worthless bits of land, and lacked
farming implements, equipment, credit, and organization. . . . But the nation's conception of the ejido has been in reality far other . . . . As an
institution [the ejido] shoulders a double responsibility: as a social system it
must make the country worker free from the exploitation to which he was
subject under the feudal as well as under the individualistic system; and as a
system of agricultural production it must render such a yield as to provide the
country at large with food . ...
The Constitution further guarantees the permanence and the stability of the
ejido institution, preventing its absorption by large estates as well as its degeneration into individual holdings so small as to defeat the ends desired of it.
The ideas expressed here have remained part of the ideology and beliefs of agrarian
workers and repeatedly have been expressed in the recent land occupations by farm
workers.

55.
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From 1915 to 1935, land distributed to ejidos totaled approximately
10,000,000 hectares which benefited between 783,000 to 986,000
ejidatarios, depending upon which tables are consulted. 59 Yet, the
needs of 2,500,000 peasants and their families remained unsatisfied
while the agricultural census of 1930 revealed that more than eighty
percent of all land remained in private hands in plantations of 1,000
60
hectares or more.
Cirdenas, at the center of national controversy and international
disputes, doubled not only the amount of land expropriated and distributed to ejidos, but also the number of beneficiaries. 61 In order to
expropriate such large quantities of agricultural lands and other mineral, oil, commercial, and railroad property, Cdrdenas pushed through
the protection of "small property" by amending article 27 of the
Constitution on January 9, 1934.62 This concession to supporters of
private property enabled Cirdenas to express his concern for land
distribution unfettered.
His activities centered on regional patterns. In the Yucatin peninsula, forty individuals controlled fifty percent of the henequ6n fiber
production. 63 In 1937, Cirdenas expropriated 100,000 hectares and
distributed them to 8,000 families. 64 He created one of the first state
enterprises. This was a state sponsored organization to regulate the
production and control the sale and manufacture of twine.65 The
Laguna region, located in north-central M6xico and noted for wheat
and cotton cultivation, was owned primarily by British and Spanish
59. See notes 4, 48 and 49.
60. Thompson, supra note 6, at 561.
61. See notes 48 and 49 for these quantities. Dr. Padgett describes Cfrdenas in the
following manner:
Once in the presidency Cdrdenas began to build the political strength he
would need to expand the drive toward revolutionary goals far beyond the
limits marked off by Obreg6n and Calles. He began by moving simultaneously
in a number of directions. . . . Cirdenas placed himself fully in the mainstream of the revolutionary heritage by pushing a bill through the Congress in
1936 which made any property defined as having "public utility" subject to
expropriation. The constitutional basis of the law was Article 27, and it was
designed to fill in gaps in the Agrarian Code of 1934. The President was given
nearly unlimited discretion to determine what was susceptible of expropriation.
The law was applied to industrial and commercial as well as to agricultural
property.
PADGETr, POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 35-36.
62. DE NAVARRETE, BIENESTAR COMPESINO Y DESARROLLO ECONOMICO 136 (M6x-

ico, 1971) [hereinafter cited as DENAVARRETE, BIENESTAR CAMPESINO]. See note 46 for
the definition of small property.
63. Thompson, supra note 6, at 567.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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nationals. Cirdenas expropriated large quantities of this land and, in
accordance with the new definition of "'small property" under article
27, the previous owners were allowed to select 150 hectares of humid
land and a proportionate share of pasture land.66 In the Yaqui Valley
which is located in the northwestern State of Sonora and the scene of
recent conflicts, 67 Cirdenas expropriated 20,000 hectares from United
68
States citizens.
Cirdenas was aware that land distribution alone would not bring
the revolution into reality or end the unrest in the countryside. He saw
the need to go beyond the National Bank of Agricultural Credit, whose
funds were controlled by large land owners, and in 1935 established
the National Bank of Ejido Credit. The Ejido Bank was designed to
meet the specific needs of the ejidos.69 Not only did Cirdenas' move
effectively separated the two land tenure systems, but it cut deeper.
The separation managed to separate the ejido from the normal
economic channels resulting in the envelopment within its own
communal philosophy while the rest of agriculture, as well as the
urban and commercial developments, kept the private property individualistic philosophy.
The creation of the Ejido Bank was crucial to the survival of the
ejidos. Initially, the credit advanced to the newly created 'community
societies of credit' worked well.70 Yet, in spite of these auspicious
beginnings, the Ejidal Bank became the subject of suspicion by the
ejidatarios. In the past, the Ejido Bank has often failed to recover
payment of its loans and, therefore, these loans were regarded as
subsidies.71
Distrust was fostered further by the Ejido Bank's policies. Pres66. Id.
67. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 20, 1976, § I, at 13, col. 1.
68. Thompson, supra note 6, at 567-69. After service on the old foreign debt had
been suspended for 15 years, the Mexican government signed the Agreement of November 1941, with the United States government, under which debts resulting from general claims derived largely from the armed rebellion were consolidated. In November,
1942, M6xico signed a new agreement with the International Committee of Bankers,
consolidating the debts of the Agreement of 1922 on favorable conditions that fixed
M6xico's obligations at the rate of one peso to the dollar, when the rate of exchange was
4.85 pesos to the dollar. A. Navarrete, The Financing of Economic Development, in
MEXICO'S RECENT ECONOMIC GROWTH 120-21 (M. Urquidi trans. 1967) [hereinafter cited
as A. Navarrete, Financing].
69. Thompson, supra note 6, at 565.
70. Id. The first year two-thirds of the credit advanced was allocated to personal
needs and the remaining one-third for seeds, animals and implements. More than half
the money was repaid within one year.
71. Karst, supra note 7, at 291.
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ently, bank credit is in specie such as seed, fertilizer and insecticides.
If the Bank is late in delivering these inputs, as is frequently the case,
the ejidatario may miss the best time for planting.72 The Bank insists
that borrowers purchase crop insurance even though this requirement is
not well received or understood by the ejidatarios. Additionally, the
Bank deducts the cost of social security payments 74 from the loans.
The ejidatarios view the local credit societies as a creation of the
Ejidal Bank and in effect, a substitute for the former landowner. 75 In
theory, these societies are composed of five ejidatarios. The Bank
does not attempt to enforce these joint obligations but the ejidatarios,
nevertheless, retain this impression.76
For these and other reasons, the efidatarios turn with great frequency to private money lenders, even though their rates may be twice
the rates of the Ejido Bank. 77 Despite these failings, in 1936 the
proportion of ejidatariosactually receiving credit from the Ejido Bank
was thirty percent. This proportion, however, has steadily declined in
the succeeding decades.78
Two significant developments were initiated by Cirdenas and
became basic to the current conflict. The first occurred in August of
1940 at an extraordinary session of the National Congress for the
purpose of proposing a new Agrarian Code. The most significant
action was the grant of certificates of inaffectability for private agricul79
tural property.
The second development was the magnitude of federal investment
72. Id.
73. Id. at 292.
74. [1972] MEX. LAB. & SOC. SEC. LAWS (Sp.-Engl. ed. CCH). Soc. Sec. article 4, §
4. Eidatarios,joint tenants, small agricultural or livestock owners are covered by the
terms of art. 8, which provides, in part,
. . . the Federal Government shall pay fifty percent of the respective premiums. . . . The National Bank for Agricultural Credit, the National Bank for
Ejido Credit, and the regional banks referred to in the Agricultural Credit Law,
shall grant credit in the amounts necessary to satisfy the Social Security contributions in those areas in which the social security system has been or is
extended to agricultural workers.
Note that Social Security is not universal. Periodically, new areas or regions or
occupational groups are brought under the program.
75. Thompson, supra note 6, at 566.
76. Karst, supra note 7, at 292.
77. Id. at 291.
78. HANSEN, supra note 43, at 82. See note 145 and 177 infra.
79. DE NAVARRETE, BIENESTAR CAMPESINO, supra note 62, at 136. The code
expanded the ejidos to dry lands, sanctions for code violations were added, the
communal grants received legal status, land for livestock was included in the issuance of
certificates of inaffectability. This code was promulgated on December 31, 1942. See

notes 107-09 for the Agrarian Reform Code sections.
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in roads and irrigation. 80 These expenditures shot from approximately
25% of the total federal investment to 45% from the period of 1935 to
1939.81 For the first time the North and North Pacific regions received
substantial input for federal roads and irrigation.82 These expenditures
were designed to aid the ejidos directly. During this period, the North
and Center regions of M6xico contained 75% of all ejidos, 85% of the
hectares benefited by federal irrigation, and 78% of the roads paved
between 1935 and 1940.83
C~irdenas' accomplishments were many, for under his direction,
new stimulus was given to the drive toward greater nationalism and
more effective political democracy. He lead the fight for labor organization, popular education, limitation on the powers of the Church,
expropriation of mineral and oil fields and, above all, agrarian reform,
which remained his primary concern.84 The amendments to article 27,
his proposal for protecting agricultural and cattle raising lands from
future expropriation, the distribution of nearly half the available cropland to ejidos,85 the creation of the Ejidal Bank, the development of
80. C. REYNOLDS, THE MEXICAN ECONOMY 155 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
REYNOLDS]. This chart demonstrates the large increases of federal spending in two key
areas regarding agriculture.
Table of Total Federal Investment in Irrigation and Roads 1925-63 (percents)
Roads and Irrigation
Proportion of
Proportion of
as Share of
Federal Investment Federal Investment
Total Federal Investment
in Roads
in Irrigation
22.6
8.5
14.1
1925-29
27.5
16.2
11.3
1930-23
45.2
26.6
18.6
1935-39
42.4
27.3
15.1
1940-44
36.4
19.9
16.5
1945-49
32.6
16.7
15.9
1950-54
25.8
13.9
11.9
1955-59
18.9
10.7
8.2
1960-63
81. Id.
82. Id. at 156. This chart clearly demonstrates the beginning efforts to expand the
quantity of cropland in three important regions in 1940 and affords ample evidence for
the governmental policy to create commercial agriculture for domestic and foreign use.
The North and North Pacific regions had extensive uncultivated land and was sparsely
populated.
Hectares of Land Benefited by Major Federal Irrigation Projects
(000 hectares)
1958
1950
1930
1940
560
363
97
2
North
53
5
0
0
Gulf
839
402
37
0
North Pacific
24
21
0
0
South Pacific
400
247
123
15
Center
1,876
1,038
17
257
Total
83. Id.
84. Thompson, supra note 41, at 568-69.
85. HANSEN, supra note 43, at 34.
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publicly owned state enterprises, and the funneling of federal funds
into irrigation and road building contributed to the remaking of a new
and different social, political and economic nation. These policies
became the basis for the growth and development that was to follow
Crdenas.
III.

AGRARIAN AND ECONOMIC POLICIES BETWEEN

1940 AND 1970

Cfirdenas' policies successfully ended the unstable political situation, 86 effectively institutionalized the Revolution and its nationalism,
and provided the necessary impetus for economic growth.87 Succeeding administrations consolidated the gains derived from these new
institutions and policies. The criterion used for the careful expansion
through state enterprises was based on the public interest. 88 The federal government assumed the responsibility to guide and orient, directly
or indirectly, all public and private investment in agriculture, industry
and other activities. 89 The ejido continued to receive favorable presidential attention, primarily through additional land distribution de90
crees.
The success of irrigation and road construction gave increased
impetus to even larger federal projects. 91 These projects involved a
major policy change, 92 for they shifted the major emphasis from the
older and more heavily populated regions to the North and North
Pacific regions. 93 It located these projects away from the majority of
ejidos and into areas that directly benefited private owners of uncultivated lands. 94 This shift made possible the slow creation of largescale properties, which were justified as socially desirable because of a
higher level of productivity. 95 This production of commercial crops of
exportable quantity made possible the importation of capital goods
through the favorable balance of trade.96
supra note 4, at 39-40.
87. Id. at 40-43.
88. V. Urquidi, Fundamental problems of the Mexican Economy, in MEXICO'S
RECENT ECONOMIC GROWTH 180-81 (M. Urquidi trans. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
Urquidi].
89. Id.
90. PADGETr, POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 195. President L6pez Mateos
added 16,000,000 hectares by the end of 1964. This brought the grand total of land
distributed to 59,500,000 hectares. But see note 49.
91. See note 80 and 82.
92. REYNOLDS, supra note 80, at 157.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. PADGETIT, POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 38.
96. HANSENsupra note 43, at 63.
86. PADGETT, POLITICAL SYSTEM,
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The success of commercial crops was beneficial to the nation, to
the large landowners and, to some extent, to the ejidos. It is generally
the quality of the land, rather than the form of ownership, which was
distinguished subsistence farming from commercial agriculture in
Mexico.9 7 Several factors must be examined to understand the role of
the ejido in relation to other agricultural sectors. Those factors are not
only the quality of its land, but its share of total land, its productivity,
the general standard of living, the levels of income, the pressures of
population growth, the increases of agricultural workers, the proportion of rural to urban populations, the reliance on corn growing,
official price supports for basic commodities, the relative decreased of
federal funds for agriculture, the increase in federal investments in
state owned industries, and the decrease in available official credit to
the ejido.
By 1960 approximately 40,000,000 hectares had been distributed. 98 Of this amount only 1,500,000 hectares receive regular
rainfall while 8,500,000 hectares have seasonal rainfall. The remainder of nearly 30,000,000 hectares, although distributed, remained
unsuitable for crops. 99 Even though one-fourth of all efido land is
designated suitable for cultivation, only sixty-three percent of that
percentage is actually cultivated. 100 The inescapable conclusion is that
the quality of ejido land is generally poor with only 6,500,000 hectares
actually in production. 101 The pace of distribution actually accelerated
during the 1960's, although an increasing amount of the land is
marginal or not cropland at all. 102 By the end of 1964, President L6pez
97. Id. at 62.
98. REYNOLDS, supra note 80, at 141.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 144. This chart accurately shows, in the first column, the quantity of ejido
land designated cropland and which constitutes approximately one-fourth of all land
distributed. The second column states the number of hectares actually cultivated by
land-poor ejidatarios. (thousands of hectares).
Total Arable Land Distributed
Region
in Ejidos as of 1960
North
2,485
Gulf
1,812
North Pacific
1,095

Total Ejidal
land Cultivated
in 1960
1,629
1,021
681

South Pacific

1,622

773

Center
Mexico
(total)

3,314

2,404

10,328

6,508

101.

Id.

102.

HANSEN, supra note 41, at 83.
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Mateos added 16,000,000 hectares which
brought the grand total of
03
land distributed to 59,500,000 hectares.'
The productivity of producing ejido land is on a par with other
privately held land. In 1960 ejidos produced 36% of all farm output
and marketed 34%.104 Significantly, over 25% of total ejidal crop
production was exported. These figures reveal that ejidal agriculture,
05
in the aggregate, is as commercially oriented as private agriculture,'
for it constitutes less than one-half of all cultivated cropland."0
Private agricultural land, as defined by article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 and the Law of Agrarian Reform, is protected from
expropriation if it does not exceed the predetermined limits of 100
hectares of humid or irrigated land or its equivalents. 107 The owner is
protected in two important ways. First, he is given the right to request
and receive a certificate of inaffectability, 10 8 and second, he has the
right to petition for a juico de amparo, or an injunction. 109 These two
103. REYNOLDS, supra note 80, at 157.
104. HANSEN, supra note 43, at 63.
105. Id.
106. Derived from a comparison between the total ejido land actually cultivated, see
note 100 supra, and the total private land indicated in note 1l1 infra.
107. Law of Agrarian Reform, art. 249. Article 249 provides in part:
Small properties are not affected by the concept of dotation (grants) or
expansion or creation of new centers of population, if they are developed and
do not exceed the following areas:
1. One hundred irrigated or humid land of first quality, or that sum which
result from either kind of land in accordance with the following equivalencies in
the following articles;
II. Up to 150 hectares if dedicated to growing cotton and if it derives
irrigation from fluvial canals or by pumping.
III. Up to 300 hectares if developed in bananas, sugar cane, coffee, sisal,
rubber, coconuts, grapevines, olives, quinine, vanilla, cacao, or fruit trees, and
IV. Such area that does not exceed that which is necessary to maintain
500 head of livestock (cattle, horses) or its equivalent in smaller livestock
(sheep, goats).
Translation provided by the author. See note 26, supra, which describes the power to
expropriate land and note 46, supra, for the definition of small agricultural property.
108. Id. art. 257, which provides in part that any owner or possessor of any arable
land, to the extent of article 249, who is utilizing or developing the land, has the right to
obtain a declaration of inaffectability and to the issue of the appropriate certificate. No
accord will be issued, nor will a certificate of inaffectability be granted that results from
a division of property unless the proponent prove that it is legal and effective and each of
the divisions is worked individually by each of its owners. Translation provided by the
author.
109. Id. Article 219 also provides that land that is not within the maximum limits,
that is capable of being appropriated and has not received certificates of inaffectability
may petition the federal government for indemnity, but may lose the right of petition one
year after publication of the expropriation in the Diario Oficial. Translation provided by
the author.
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protections have been used successfully by owners of large tracts to
accumulate and preserve considerable quantities of such land from
expropriation. 110
Within the category of private agricultural land is another segment of farmers which usually are unnoticed because they farm miniparcels that closely resemble the ejido plot. In 1960, nearly 1,000,000
farmers cultivated an average of 1/2 hectares per family.'1 1 Even
though they constitute 77% of all private owners, they controlled only
11% of all privately owned farmland. 112 In the ejido sector over 45%
of all ejidatarios farm between one and four hectares.' 3 With the
combination at these two sectors, 2,000,000 farmers, private and
110. The usual method has been to register portions of such land in the names of
various members of a family. Under the administration of President L6pez Mateos many
large farms and pastoral operations enjoying certificates of inaffectability were to see
their certificates revoked during the ensuing years. Within two years of taking office
there had already been distributed 3,200,000 hectares of land. Over the six-year period,
119,801 certificates of agrarian rights were issued. Much of the land distributed was
public land. The government had prepared new centers of population in order to resettle
persons away from old and exhausted lands in the center of Mexico. PADGETT, POLITICAL
SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 195.
111. HANSEN, supra note 43, at 78. This chart shows the two extremes in landholdings. Approximately 929,000 miniparcel farmers held nearly 11% of total private land but
2,000 individuals controlled more than 35% of the available private land.
DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE CROPLAND, 1960
size of holdings
Number of Holdings
Total Area
(in hectares)
Thousands
%
Thousands
%
Up to 5
5.1-10
10.1-25
25.1-50
100.1-200
200.1-400
400.1 and over
Total

929
95
103
22
10
3
2
1,201

77.2
8.0
8.6
1.8
0.8
0.3
0.2
100.0

1,461
665
1,581
1,499
1,329
888
4,787
13,490

10.8
4.9
11.7
11.1
9.9
6.6
35.5
100.0

Since 1960,the continued expansion of irrigation has brought more land into production
lowering the proportion of cultivated ejido land even more.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 79. This chart demonstrates by percentages the condition of the majority
of ejidatarios.
DISTRIBUTION OF EJIDAL CROPLAND, 1960
Ejidos
Ejidatarios

Cropland per
Ejidatario
(in hectares)
Up to 1
1.1-4
4.1-10
over 10.1
Total

Number

%

Number

%

1,124
5,681
7,878
3,618
18,301

6.2
31.0
43.0
19.8
100.0

147,118
521,044
612,984
230,979
1,512,125

9.7
34.5
40.5
15.3
100.0
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ejido, constitute 55% of all farmers and cultivate plots incapable of
sustaining a single family.' 14 By contrast, the 1960 census registered
2,053 units or 37,800 individuals with an average holding of 2,331
hectares of cropland. 115 It is evident from these statistics that the land
distribution policies have not accomplished the goal of establishing
economically independent farmers capable of sustaining more than a
subsistence standard of living, as the income level and distribution will
attest.
In terms of agricultural productivity, the miniparcel owner who
normally farms without irrigation, 116 official credit, farm machinery,
or any of the grants available to some ejidatariosis the most efficient
producer. 7 He is followed by the ejidatariowho, in turn, is followed
by the owner of large private farms. 1 I These large private farms were
credited with an eighty percent increase in the value of agricultural
production from 1950 to 1960.119 This increase, however, is attributed
to the large public investments in irrigation and roads that followed the
Cirdenas administration and have continued to this day. 120 This investment doubled the cropland from that which existed in 1930, but the
proportion of ejido land to private land dropped below the ratio that
prevailed in 1940.121
This decrease is significant particularly because during the same
period of 1950 to 1960, the population grew by nearly 10,000,000
persons. 122 Moreover, even though there was a considerable migration from the rural to the urban areas, 123 the number of landless
agricultural workers increased from 2,300,000 in 1950 to 3,300,000 in
114.

Id. at 78.

115. Id. at 79.
116. The Law of Agrarian Reform, supra note 31, art. 57, which recognizes the
concurrent right of "small properties" to use the available water from whatever source.
117. HANSON, supra note 43, at 62-63. Despite these disadvantages, the 1960 census
figures reveal that the holdings under five hectares produced higher yields per hectare in
several crops, including corn, cotton, and beans, than either the ejido or the large

commercial farms. The difference is in applying the one input at their disposal, their
own labor.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 80.
120. See note 82 for the regional patterns of irrigated land to 1958.

121. REYNOLDS, supra note 80, at 157. See also note 40 supra.
122. HANSEN, supra note 43, at 42. In 1940, the population was 20,000,000 with a 1.7
growth rate. In 1950, the population was 25,000,000 with a 2.8 growth rate. In 1960, the

population was 35,000,000 with a 3.1 growth rate. In 1975, the population was estimated
at 62,000,000 with a growth rate of 3.5.
123.

REYNOLDS, supra note 80, at 93.
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1960,124 and the population growth rate had pushed this figure to
5,000,000 by 1975.125 Estimates that the per capita rate of employment
for farm workers had fallen from 194 days per year in 1950 to 100 days
of work in 1960 reflect the true extent of unemployment and underemployment in the agrarian sector.1 26 Total employment showed some
healthy increases between 1940 and 1960 for the proportion employed
increased from one-fourth to one-third of total population in this
27

period. 1

Employment increase as an abstract concept does not project the
true picture unless the levels of income are included. In 1956 the first
comprehensive survey on family income comparing industrial income
with agricultural income was released.1 28 The survey determined that
in 1950 an average of 700 pesos per month per family was barely
sufficient to provide minimum food, clothing, housing and amusement. 129 It further indicated that three-fourths of all families had an
income of less than 500 pesos per month. 130 While this segment re124. HANSEN, supra note 43, at 81.
125. Banco Nacional De Comercio, S.A., Comercio Exterior De Mexico,
March 1975, at 82. [hereinafter cited as Comercio Exterior]. Comercio Exterior de
M6xico is an authorized monthly publication of the official Banco Nacional de
Comercio, S.A. Its board of directors include the Mexican Finance Secretary, Mr. Mario
Ram6n Beteta, who often contributes articles to it, and Mr. Ernesto Fernindez Hurtado,
Director of the Banco de M6xico, the central bank of Mexico.
126. HANSEN, supra note 43, at 81.
127. Urquidi, supra note 88, at 174-75.
128. I.M. De Navarrete, Income Distribution in Mixico, in MEXICO'S RECENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH 137 (M. Urquidi trans. 1967) [hereinafter cited as De Navarrete,
Income].
129. Id. at 132. Note that these findings include noncash inputs in the family
monthly income.
130. Id. at 155. The low level of income is in inverse proportion to the degree of
industrialization. Wage earners in the labor force are a good indicator of this level. The
following breakdown by region illustrates their differences. As indicated earlier, public
investment in agriculture has had a substantial effect in its income generating capacity.
The same effect occurs in public investment in manufacturing establishments. Note that
the two regions showing the highest percentages of families with income below 500 pesos
per month also have 60% of its population with income of less than 300 pesos per month
per family.

Federal District
North Pacific
North
Gulf of Mexico
Central
South Pacific
Mexico (averages)

Percentage
Wage earners

Percentage
Population

Percentage
Farmer
Income

Percentage
Income
Below 500

70.4
56.6
43.1
38.0
37.4
24.7
43.4

24.9
12.1
19.7
11.6
23.5
8.2
100.0

1.1
27.2
36.5
42.0
47.0
48.2
36.1

50.0
50.2
75.2
47.4
82.5
79.6
78.9
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ceived 38% of total income, at the opposite end of the scale, 12,000
families or 2.4% of the total had incomes of more than 3,000 pesos a
131
month and enjoyed 32% of all available income.
Subsequent studies in 1957132 and in 1961-62133 revealed that
46% remained at the 500 peso level with the next lowest category of
22% receiving 300 pesos per family per month. 134 At the point where
the income level rises above the 500 peso level, the urban family takes
135
over and the rural family is left behind.
A partial answer to the levels of income of the rural family lie
with two important governmental policies. The first has been alluded
to previously and refers to large scale public investments and expenditures in agriculture. 136 These expenditures created the expansion of
cropland and the increase in agricultural production and profits of
large scale commercial agriculture. 137 Note that this major transfer of
resources from urban to rural activities did not increase the level of
38
spendable income of the majority of farm families.1
A second government policy to affect rural family income is the
creation of a federal agency, Compania Nacional de Subsistencias
Populares (CONASUPO), which is designed to control the prices of
basic commodities and to provide price support guarantees to the
farmers.13 9 CONASUPO is in charge of buying, storing, selling and
supplying basic commodities for export as well as for national
comsumption. Its most important goal is to intervene between the
abuses and gross inequities that are perpetrated by middlemen and
wholesalers upon unsophisticated farmers. '10 CONASUPO attempted
to maximize the income received by small farmers by controlling this
direct link between the producers and consumers of foodstuffs. 141 Its
Note that percentage population figures were derived from De Navarrete Income, supra
note 128, at 146.
131. Id. at 162.
132. Id.
133. P. GONZALEZ CASANOVA, DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO 239-40 (D. Salti trans. 1970).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. REYNOLDS, supra note 80, at 178.
137. Id.

138. Id. at 155.
139.

PADGETT, POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 217.

140. For an excellent portrayal of the abuses that an efidatarioor miniparcel farmer
goes through in order to sell his crops in the produce markets, see R. Villareal C~irdenas,
La Comercializaci6n de los Productos Agropecuarios, in BIENESTAR CAMPESINO Y
DESARROLLO ECONOMICO, (I.M. De Navarrete ed. 1971).
141. PADGEITr, POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 217.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol8/iss1/11

20

Stone: Mexican Agrarian Rights: Who Do They Benefit?
CALIFORNIA

WESTERN INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 8

main objective is to keep prices down. The prices set by the government on basic comsumption items is designed to coincide with the
prevailing income levels of the majority of citizens. CONASUPO
supports the government price controls by selling at a price lower than
private stores which forces them to compete. 142 Thus, the price guarantees on basic commodities results in an indirect subsidy by the ejido
and miniparcel farmers in favor of the greater population.
Government policies regarding control of basic commoditites,
through prices and minimum wages, primarily affect the farmer and
daily wage earner. An examination of the dependence upon corngrowing makes the extent and importance of these government
controls apparent. The dependence on corn growing by a large proportion of ejido and miniparcel farmers flows naturally from the high
levels of corn consumption in the rural areas. 143 Large numbers of
farmers from both groups are familiar with corn, and, therefore, do not
know how to grow other crops. 144 The money lenders do not encourage
the raising of other crops because they have established market arrangements for corn and not for other more profitable crops. 45 The
major reason for the crop's dominance, however, was the relatively
high governmental price set for corn. 146 However, these prices remained static, inflexible and unresponsive to inflationary pressures
resulting in low incomes for these farmers and a decreasing number of
hectares devoted to corn growing. This development has forced the
federal government in the 1970's, through CONASUPO, to import
47
large quantities of corn. 1
Price controls over basic commodities was only one phase of the
extensive controls exercised under the direction of the President and
the executive agencies. Public investment in a mixed economy was
first carried out by President Cirdenas and has been expanded pragmatically and successfully by succeeding administrations. 148 Public
142. Id.

143. Id. at 228. It is estimated that only 13% of the urban population do not eat bread
made from wheat, while over 50% of the rural population fall in this category.
144. Karst, supra note 7, at 287.
145. Id. The importance of money lenders has been growing since the credit advanced by the Ejido Bank to the ejidatanios has decreased from 30% in 1936 to 14% in
1960. HANSEN, supra note 43, at 82. See note 177 infra for more recent loan levels.
146. Karst, supra note 7, at 287. But see note 173 infra for the detrimental effects of
price controls.
147. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Feb. 1975, at 55.
148. E. Fermindez Hurtado, Private Enterpriseand Government in Mexican Devel-
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works and basic investments laid the foundation for private investments with more than one-third of such investments derived from
public funds. 149 At first, such investment was mainly in irrigation,
transport and communications, electric power, and the petroleum industries.1 50 It is significant that during this period of growth internal
savings furnished nearly 90% of the capital investment in the private
sector. 151 Public financing, which was derived primarily from federal
15 2
revenues, required only 9% of foreign borrowing.
A major governmental tactic designed to direct and guide both
public and private investment through public and private banks has
been the manipulation of credit. This is accomplished through a system
of federal reserve requirements imposed by the central bank, which is
the Bank of M6xico. 153 These reserves range between 15% and 50% on
deposit and savings banks. In order to maintain this interest free
minimum deposit the banks must invest 85% of their funds under
government direction. 5 4 These controls are designed to regulate the
money supply, the liquidity of the economy, and to direct the available
savings into the promotion of economic development, first through the
155
public and secondly, through the private sector.
Initially, the government directed these financial flows into agriculture. It is unlikely that agricultural net savings would have been as
great between 1945 and 1960 if the government had not used taxes
from industry and commerce to finance the rural infrastructure in the
early years. 156 This permitted agriculture eventually to supply loanable
funds for commercial activities through the banking system and nonbank financial intermediaries.' 57 The ejido sector received increasing58
ly smaller amounts of official credits. 1
opment, in MEXICO'S RECENT ECONOMIC GROWTH 53-54 (M. Urquidi trans. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as Fermindez Hurtado].
149. Id. at 55.
150. Id. at 58.
151. A. Navarrete, Financing, supra note 68, at 126.
152. Id. at 120.
153. R.M. Beteta, The Central Bank, Instrument of Economic Development in Mexico, in MEXICO'S RECENT ECONOMIC GROWTH 76 (M. Urquidi trans. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as Beteta].
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. REYNOLDS, supra note 80, at 179.
157. Id.
158. See note 145 supra and note 177 infra.
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More importantly, Mexican agricultural development has provided an increasing, source of foreign exchange earnings for the agricultural sector and an export surplus with the rest of the world. 159 It
received appropriate official and private bank credits to finance its
needs and this export surplus has enabled the industrial sector to import
needed capital goods for the industrialization of M6xico. 160 The pace
Mexico's ability to finance its
of industrialization was in step with
61
borrowings.1
foreign
and
domestic
To achieve industrialization for the purpose of solving the employment problem of M6xico's increasing population, it was necessary
to follow a policy of active governmental intervention. 162 Public investment has been more than compensatory; it has been decisive in
increasing the overall investment and raising the growth rate.1 63 This
public investment embraces not only the federal, state and municipal
governments, but also the autonomous agencies and the industrial,
commercial, and, financial corporations partially or wholly owned by
the government.

IV.

64

AGRARIAN AND ECONOMIC CHANGES
UNDER PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA

Public investment through state enterprises had worked well
under the revolutionary philosophy of government guided investment
in the industrialization process. In terms of the gross national product,
the share of industrial production increased to 35%, while the share of
agricultural production decreased from 23% to 16% in the period from
1940 to 1967.165
Not only did agriculture lose its predominant position in the
economy, but it was subject to several demographic modifications.
The rural population decreased from 71% to nearly 50% of total
population which has impacted upon the urban centers. The rural
economically active population also decreased from 65% to 54% in
1960.166
During President Echeverria's term from 1970 to 1976, the situa159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

P6rez L6pez, supra note 42, at 33.
REYNOLDS, supra note 80, at 179.
P6rez L6pez, supra note 42, at 37.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Urquidi, supra note 88, at 190.
HANSEN, supra note 43, at 43.
REYNOLDS, supra note 80, at 93.
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tion became even more serious. By 1973,167 agriculture's share of
employment had dropped to 40% while nearly 56% of the total population was below the age of nineteen. 168 The total population had
climbed to nearly sixty-two million persons by 1975 which included
five million agricultural workers.' 69 The inability of farmers or peasants to secure employment in the rural communities exacerbates the
problems that land distribution programs were designed to solve. Total
agricultural employment was under six million in 1975 with 200,000
fewer employed in agriculture than during the 1960's. While decreasing the number of subsistence farmers is a good indicator that a
country's economy is proceeding to develop economically, commercial and industrial employment must provide jobs. However, total
employment once again had dropped to the level that prevailed in 1940
which was one-fourth of total population. 170 Estimates of unemployment figures range from nine million workers or 30% of the labor
force, to as high as sixteen million 171 with unemployment in the border
cities as high as 50%.172 This unemployment occurred despite the
massive investment by the federal government in industrial expansion.
At the time when agriculture could not employ the number of
available workers, the prices of basic commodities were frozen at the
1960s level. The guaranteed prices paid by CONASUPO continues as
a major agricultural policy. These prices, with minor changes, re167. SEMANARIO DE NACIONAL FINANCIERA S.A., CaracteristicasEcon6micas del
Estado de Nuevo Leon, in EL MERCADO DE VALORES, Aug. 16, 1976, at 640.
POPULATION ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE BY OCCUPATION
(15,087,000 employed)
(000)
(%)
Agriculture
5,942.8
39.4
Oil Industry
98.1
.7
Mining
110.1
.7
Manufacturing
2,527.1
16.8
Construction
665.3
4.4
Electric
61.9
.4
Commerce
1,394.0
9.2
Transportation
430.0
2.8
Services
2,513.7
16.7
Government
473.7
3.1
Unspecified
870.5
5.8
168. Id. at 641.
169. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, at 82.
170. Urquidi, supra note 88, at 175.
171. San Diego Evening Tribune, Jan. 26, 1977, § A, at 6, col. 1.
172. Mamulkin, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of the Undocumented Mexican
Alien Worker, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 46 (1975).
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73
mained in force until the 1973-74 winter cycle when they doubled. 1
All three sectors of agriculture began to withdraw from growing these
in
basic commodities which resulted in the dramatic decline of 11.5% 174
Mrxico.
of
people
the
of
diet
the
to
basic
farm products considered
The agricultural growth rate has been averaging less than 1%per year
while the population growth rate continues at 3.5% per year. Consequently there is a marked decline in per capita agricultural production. 175 By contrast, during this same period, agricultural exports have
been increasing at 2% per year. 176 The growth of population, increases
in farm unemployment and underemployment, together with frozen
prices for farm commodities produced larger demands for jobs and for
land.
Farm investments and credit show similar decreases for both
private agriculture and public inputs. 77 Public investment in the
1970's has shown an increase only because the federal government has
been compelled to import ever increasing amounts of food. 178 The
deterioration and dislocation in the agriculture setting can be exemplified best by noting that food imports averaged 1% of total food
exports in the period between 1965 and 1970. Such imports rose to
10% between 1970 and 1972 and dramatically spiraled to an average of
50% of the total farm exports by value in 1973 and 1974.179 The
173. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Aug. 1975, at 270, Feb. 1976, at 56, Jan.
1975, at 15, July 1975, at 232.
The price support of corn bought by CONASUPO was 562 pes6s per ton in 1956,
and 680 pesos in 1957. From 1958 to 1963 it was 800 pesos; from 1963 to the summer of
1973 it was 940 pesos per ton. In the 1973-74 winter cycle it rose to 1,225 pesos, in May,
1974, to April, 1975, it rose to 1,350, in May, 1975, it rose to 1,750, and in September,
1975, it rose to 1,900. While these price supports were in effect, foreign imports of corn
ranging in size from 17,000 tons to I million tons were purchased between 1970 and 1973.
While,the price support was 940 pesos per ton, the government was paying between
1,200 and 1,650 pesos per ton.
In the case of wheat the picture is similar. The support price between 1960 and 1965
was 913 pesos per ton, from 1966 to the 1972-73 winter cycle it was 800; imported wheat
was purchased at 2,250 pesos a ton in 1972 and 1973. However, the price support paid by
CONASUPO was 1,300 in 1973-74 winter cycle, 1,500 in the 1974-75 winter cycle, and
1,750 as of May 1975.
174. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Feb. 1975, at 55.
175. Id. This per capita agricultural productivity is 4.5% below the level that prevailed in 1962.
176. Id. at 54.
177. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Feb. 1976, at 54. Private agricultural
investment had been increasing at a 10% annual rate. Private banks only contributed
about 4% of the total credit in the 1970's. Public agricultural investment which averaged
20% in 1947 to 1952 dropped to 10% in the 1960's and to 8% in 1970.
178. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Jan., 1975, at 15.
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cumulative effect produced by decades of neglect of the agricultural
sector devoted to basic staples in favor of the sector dedicated to farm
exports in order to gain foreign exchange for industrialization, has
been widely and officially recognized. 180 This was particularly harmful
to the ejido and miniparcel farmers who had grown to depend upon
corn and other staple commodities. Faced with rigid price controls,
declining farm employment, basic wage limits, and ever increasing
inflation, these farmers withdrew from corn and wheat cultivation
despite small increases in the price support schedules. Consequently,
18
they reduced the quantity of hectares devoted to these staples. 1
Lest the degree of control exercised by the national government
over income and benefits be underestimated, the following example is
offered. Ejido farmers living in the desert zones have supplemented
their farm income by producing wax and wax candles. By presidential
decree, the Technical Committee for the Distribution of Candelilla
Wax Fund Resources raised the price per kilo of wax from nine to
179. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Feb., 1976, at 55.
The guarantee prices paid by CONASUPO for basic farm commodities is one of
the most important elements of the country's agricultural policy. These prices
were practically frozen for almost ten years and it was not until the first quarter
of 1974 that steps were taken to adjust them to current conditions, improve
peasant income and stimulate production. Guarantee prices were bolstered by
two new elements: price supports and market prices. Guarantee prices are the
Government's tacit commitment to buy all available production at established
quotations. This refers chiefly to sesame seed, corn, sunflower seed and wheat,
whose purchase is controlled by CONASUPO. Price supports are fixed to back
and stimulate production in special programs, with no obligation on the part of
CONASUPO to purchase available output.
Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Feb., 1976 at 56.
180. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Jan., 1975, at 15. A joint statement issued
by the Ministry of Agriculture and other agrarian agencies recognized this neglect:
There was a marked difference in the real income of farmers: those with
artificial irrigation, credits and organization enjoyed high earnings; other, the
majority, deprived of these elements, experienced a truly difficult year. . . not
everything is attributable to weather conditions; it must be recognized that the
administrative apparatus lacked the capacity to make credit more operative.
• . . The situation will not be much improved in the next two years. The
problems affecting agriculture cannot be solved overnight. We are now in the
unfortunate position of having to correct conditions created over the past three
decades.
Comercio Exterior, supra, note 125, Feb. 1975, at 55.
181. BANCO NACIONAL DE MiXICO, BANAMEX, Nov., 1976, at 349. Jose L.pez
Portillo, Minister of Finance and Public Credit in President Echeverria's administration
and current President of Mexico states:
What were the alternatives? Not to use [foreign] credit or not to feed the
people? For the weather had been bad and crops in 1972, 1973 and even 1974
were inadequate . . . basic grains were purchased abroad at incredibly high
prices and sold cheaply at home. Wheat, for example, climbed from 900 pesos a
ton in 1970 to over 2,250 pesos in 1972 and 1973 and was sold at the first price in
the Mexican market . ...
Comercio Exterior, supra, note 125, July, 1975, at 232.
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fifteen pesos. Thus, the ejidatarios, producers of wax were brought
into the social security system 182 and the increase in price contributed
three pesos per kilo to the Social Security Institute. Between April and
December of 1973, these contributions amounted to 4,200,000 pesos
and the cooperative candelilla fund increased by 14,500,000 pesos,
183
which was used to improve and invest in ejido infrastructures.
The decline in grains of sufficient quantity to feed the population
caused President Echeverria to transfer the state enterprise concept
from industry and commerce to agriculture on July 9, 1975. He
declared the formation of the National Company to Promote Food
Grain Production who's working capital was to be provided by the
federal government, CONASUPO, and the National Ejidal Credit
Bank. These organizations are each to supply 25% of the funds needed
while the National Confederation of Farmers (CNC) and the National
Confederation of Small Property Farmers each will supply 121/2% of
the remainder. 18 The Company will grow food on its own land or such

land that it may acquire under legal title. Additionally, it will enter into
contracts with grain producers and supply them with the necessary
credits, insurance, and technical assistance.
The formation of this national grain producing company was a
recognition that President Echeverria's agricultural policies had failed.
By buying basic commodities at artificially low prices through
CONASUPO and its recently incorporated warehouses and distribution
centers, 1 85 and selling the same staples at low prices to the general
public, 186 the federal government in effect, created a system of subsidies underwritten mainly by the farmers themselves. CONASUPO's
187
net subsidies were in the storing and transporting of these staples.
These low prices were also instrumental in maintaining artifically low
daily wage levels for agricultural workers and urban laborers. 188 These
182. Comercio Exterior, supra May 1975 at 160.
183. Id. The social security system does not include all workers or farmers. By
1975, during the Echeverrian administration, there was a large expansion from 12 to
19 million persons in a population estimated at more than 62 million. Mexican Newsletter, Feb. 29, 1976, at 3. This publication is an official report emanating from the
President's Office.
184. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Aug., 1975, at 267-68.
185. Id. at271.
186. Id. note 179 supra. President Echeverria stated that he had raised the price of
sugar which had remained frozen for 12 years. Comercio Exterior, supra, note 125, Oct.,
1976, at 378. But see note 190 infra.
187. Id.
188. Banco Nacional de Mexico S.A., Banamex, Mexico: Statistical Data 1975, 14
(1976). Official price lists from major supermarkets show increases of 250 to 300%
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price structures combined with the nonavailability of agrarian credit
led to the decrease in grain production.
Agriculture was neglected and suffered damage primarily because
of the concerted efforts by President Echeverria to promote and expand
the industrial and commercial sectors of the economy. These efforts
were evident as early as 1971 when he exerted control over the
autonomous agencies and state enterprises. These efforts increased the
number of state owned enterprises from 87 in 1970 to 817 in 1974.189
These investments ranged from such basic industries as steel, oil,
electricity, roads, airports, and telephone to such commercial and
agricultural areas as newsprint, minerals, sugar, building construction,
sulphur, milk, diesel motors, cardboard, and urban properties. 190 During this period, the declared Mexican foreign debt increased from
3,200,000,000 dollars in 1970 to 8,000,000,000 in 1974. Threefourths of this debt was used by state enterprises and agencies to buy,
19 1
create and expand government owned industries and agencies.
These reports, however, appear grossly underestimated. More recent
reports covering the Echeverria six-year period place the foreign debt
92
between 20,000,000,000 and 24,000,000,000 dollars. 1
In the period between 1970 and 1974, reports placed the increase
in the gross domestic product at a 23% annual average with increases
of exports averaging 28% annually. 193 These two indicators remained
slightly ahead of the reported 20% annual inflation factor. 194 More
recent reports have estimated the inflation factor at 25% in 1974, 27%
in 1975, and 35% in 1976.195
in the last five years. Typical of these increases is 300% for bread while basic wages went
up only 236% in seven years. A workman receiving the prescribed daily wage for a
laborer in Mexico would use 56% of his daily wage if he bought tortillas, beans, rice, milk
and meat for his family. San Diego Evening Tribune, Jan. 26, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 1.
189. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Sept., 1975, at 344.
190. Id. As an example,we may take note that the sugar industry, which had only
24% governmental ownership, was increased to 55%. See note 186 supra.
191. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, July, 1975, at 232. President Echeverria in
his Sixth State of the Nation address on September 1, 1976, stated: "In this administration, public investment for the first time surpassed private investment.
... Comercio
Exterior, supra note 125, Oct., 1976, at 369.
192. San Diego Evening Tribune, Jan. 26, 1977, § A, at 6, col. I. Other reports state
that the foreign debt is actually 30,000,000,000 dollars.
193. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, July, 1975, at 233.
194. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, May, 1975, at 160.
195. San Diego Evening Tribune, Jan. 26, 1977, § A, at 6, col. 1.
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The severe decline in foreign markets was felt hard particularly by
the new industrial and commercial enterprises and thus, production
levels fell below those levels achieved prior to 1972.196 In 1974 export
credits fell by one third for industrial goods but remained strong in
farm commodities meaning that they were on a par with the inflation
factor. 197 In reality exports fell by one-half and imports doubled. 198
The combination of these factors resulted in a balance of payments
deficit in the amount of 3,643,000,000 dollars by 1975.1 99
President Echeverria, like Cirdenas, attempted to socialize every
major element of the economy, but unlike C6rdenas, Echeverria expanded productive capacity through inflation, foreign indebtedness,
and by neglecting the farming sector. Echeverria instituted major
legislative changes in agriculture with uneven results. 2°° One of his
early steps was to amend the Federal Law on Waters. The amendment
changed the list of priorities in the use of water and again emphasized
that owners of more than twenty hectares may not use the new federal
irrigation system. 2 1 In December of 1974, the Federal Agrarian Law
was amended by presidential decree to permit the expropriation of
ejidal land with full indemnification for urban uses 20 2 and the Department of Agricultural Affairs and Settlement was granted ministerial
status.20 3 To achieve greater cohesion, several farmer organizations
196. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, May, 1975, at 161. This statement was
taken from an address by E. Fernindez Hurtado, Director General of the Banco de
Mxico, the official bank in Mexico, at the Forty-First National Banking Convention in
Acapulco, Guerrero in March, 1975.
197. Id. at 159.
198. Id. at 161. This report on foreign trade shows a new classification of loans
called "pre-exports" and shows an increase of 1,000% over the prior year.
199. President Echeverria's Sixth State of the Nation address, Comercio Exterior,
supra note 125, Oct., 1976, at 371.
200. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, June, 1975, at 183. This month's issue
describes the situation in its editorial thus:
The present administration has begun to rectify a policy based on industrialization at any cost and agriculture as a mere source of foods, raw materials and
foreign exchange. This concept, which simply seeks an increase in agricultural
production, in fact has reinforced the capitalist sector, undermined the ejido
system and other forms of farmer organization, and consolidated rural structures of exploitation and dominance.
201. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Jan., 1976, at 55-56. The priorities are listed
in this order, domestic, urban services, watering places for livestock, land irrigation,
giving preference to ejido and communal farms over private properties, industrial, with
major importance given to the generation of electric power for public service, recreation,
generation of electric power for private service, soil washing and silt fertilizing.
202. Law of Agrarian Reform, supra note 31, art. 117, 122, in Official Daily of
Mexico (Diario Oficial) Dec. 31, 1974.
203. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, March, 1975, at 56.
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established the basis for unification at a meeting held at Ocampo, State
of Coahuila.20 4
In February of 1975 two important meetings occurred. The first
was a Seminar on Farmer Organization and Agroindustrial Development which was held in Oaxtepec, State of Morelos. Among the
topics discussed were the Farm Credit Law proposal, consumer credit,
increase of perishable commodity markets, violation of labor laws and
of the minimum wage laws, organization and registration of farm
unions, and the unification of existing agricultural banks. 205 The second meeting was held at the presidential residence of Los Pifios for the
purpose of announcing the National Farm Plan. The demand for food
production in the period between 1975 and 1980 was estimated, and
goals were set for the expansion of credit, irrigation of land and
allocation of production levels regarding basic foods. These are just
some of the requirements necessary before governmental credit, irrigation, and technical assistance are granted. 2 0 6 Five months after these
crucial meetings, President Echeverria decreed that the National Farm
Credit Bank, the National Ejidal Credit Bank and the Agricultural
Credit Bank be unified into a new organization called the National
Rural Credit Bank (BANRURAL). 2 7 In the same month of February,
1975, the president created the National Company to Promote Food
Grains Production 20 8 and the National Agricultural Sector Coordinat29
ing Commission. 0
By November of 1975, clashes between peasants and landowners
in the State of Sonora and elsewhere produced land invasions and
production strikes by landowners which left several dead and wounded. This state of affairs compelled President Echeverria to issue a
decree forming the Tripartite Commission for the purpose of providing
a means of conciliation and arriving at a prompt resolution of agrarian
conflicts.2 10 The situation had become so desperate that invasions had
204. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Feb., 1975, at 56.
205. Id. at 84-87. Ricardo Carrillo Arrontq, Director of the Lerma Plan, stated that
there had never been any planning in M6xico. There have only been poor imitations, set
up to obtain credit abroad, back a political group, or ensure continuity of power from one
regime to another. He asked, "How is it possible that agricultural sector planning has not
been openly discussed when it is one of the main reasons why the country is suffering an
acute food storage."
206. Id. at 85.
207. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Feb., 1976, at 56.
208. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Aug., 1975, at 267-68, in Official Daily of
Mexico (Diario Oficial) July 9, 1975.
209. Mexican Newsletter, July 31, 1975, at 5.
210. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, March 1976, at 93.
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occurred even on ejido lands.
The Rural Credit Law that was first proposed in October took
effect in December of 1975. The law was designed specifically to
encourage collective farming by providing preferential interest rates to
efidos, communities, rural production companies and miniparcel
farmers who farm collectively. 212 In May of 1976, legislation was
approved allowing the creation of Social Solidarity Societies to be
formed by laborers and peasants who donate their labor to a productive
activity that is collectively owned.213
V.

ECHEVERRIA'S LAST YEAR OF CRISIS

These agrarian measures required time and a considerable amount
of technical guidance if they were to be effective in resolving the
economic and demographic problems of M6xico. Yet, time was running out and the technical resources available to implement these
agrarian measures were insufficient. Moreover, even though these
measures complied with the basic philosophy of the Mexican Revolution and paralleled the depth and extent of the measures under taken by
former President Cfirdenas, they confronted the inherent contradictions
of article 27 of the Constitution. Recall that C6.rdenas amended this
article by creating exceptions to the expropriation powers by granting
certificates of inaffectability and by permitting landowners the use of
juicio de amparo. This created a separate segment of agriculture that
existed alongside but separate from the efido system. These exceptions also permitted the urban centers to continue operating under the
free enterprise system. The urban centers increasingly concentrated
upon commercial, banking, construction, some industrial and agricultural enterprises, while the federal government concentrated upon state
enterprises to accelerate and expand the industrialization of M6xico.
This does not mean that the urban centers were ignored as proper
subjects of federal investments. 2 14 In November of 1975, President
211. Mexican Newsletter, Sept. 1, 1975, at 16.
212. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Aug., 1975, at 269.
213. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, July, 1976, at 248. Such a society is exemplified by the construction of 1,000 new homes in La Paz, Baja California South,
Mixico, which were needed as a result of a hurricane that swept through populated
areas, killing more than 500 persons and leaving 40,000 more homeless. The 400 men
working to rebuild the area will receive a house under this Mexican government relief
agency project. Los Angeles Times, Feb. 25, 1977, § II, at 1, col. 1.
214. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Mar., 1976, at 93. As early as 1958, a
federal majority state enterprise was enacted, Urbanizadora de Tijuana, S.A., which
centered its activities in the Playas de Tijuana development. By 1974, sufficient land for
more than 580 homes and 15 business establishments had been sold and developed
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Echeverria sent a draft bill on Human Settlements to Congress. 215 The
purpose and function of the bill was to establish methods to organize
human settlements in the national territory, to develop norms and plans
for conservation, to improve and provide for the development and
growth of population centers that include existing urban areas and to
define the principles by which the nation will exercise its powers to
decide the provision, use, future uses, and the reservation of land,
water, and forests. 2 16 Moreover, three constitutional amendments were
proposed to provide the basis for approval of the bill on Human
Settlements. These amendments were promptly adopted. 2 17 First, article 73 of the Constitution was amended by adding a section empowering Congress to enact laws enabling the participation of all three levels
of government in matters of human settlements. 1 8 Second, article 27
of the Constitution was amended by establishing the nation's right to
adopt the necessary measures for the purpose of organizing human
settlements and future uses of land, water and forests. The nation may
also plan and -regulate the growth of population centers. 2 19 Third,
article 115 of the Constitution was amended to state that states and
municipalities are obligated to adopt laws and regulations and to
coordinate their actions with each other and with the federal govern220
ment whenever joint jurisdiction exists.
Unlike the agrarian measures previously outlined, the Law to
Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment, 22 1 the
Law of Inventions and Trademarks, 222 and the Law on the Transfer of
Technology, 223 the proposed bill on Human Settlements aroused violent discussion. This first crisis started as a series of isolated criticisms
but soon became a systematic and sustained attack by the bill's opponents. 224 This issue became so important that it overshadowed many
with 44% still available for future development. By 1974 it had earned 54,000,000 pesos
and employed 77 workers whose earnings amounted to 5,200,000 pesos.
215.
216.
217.

Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, April, 1976, at 132.
Id.
Id. at 133.

218.

Id. at 132.

219.

Id. at 133.

220. Id. at 132.
221. Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment (Ley
para Promover la Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n Extranjera) in Official
Daily of Mexico (Diano Oficial) March 9, 1973.
222. Law of Inventions and Trademarks (Ley de Invenciones y Marcas) in Official
Daily of Mexico (Diario Oficial) Feb. 10, 1976.
223. Id. Regulations of the Law of Inventions and Trademarks on the matter of
Transference of Technology and Linking of Trademarks.
224. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, May, 1976, at 177. The opposition to
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other pressing economic problems. The debate over this issue was
Echeverria's first major confrontation crisis and lasted more than six
months. The opposition attacked the provisions of the proposed bill on
constitutional grounds by writing articles in the daily newspapers and
journals. In particular, the changes in article 27 of the Constitution
were denounced as inimical to the real interests of the nation by
transfering from Congress and delegating to local and state officials the
power to determine the uses of land .225 Opposing attorneys analyzed
the proposal and concluded that it provided for arbitrary and undefined
discretionary powers, that it was vague, that it lacked clearly stated
objectives, and that the means of achieving them were not included in
226
a clear and unambiguous manner.
Critics pointed out that the bill contained serious drafting errors
by not specifically defining the powers to regulate property by the
three different levels of government. This was done by creating the
delegated powers in such a way that it left the three levels of government in direct opposition to each other, and simultaneously left such
conflicts to be resolved at the discretion of the president. 227 The lack of
guidelines and standards for local authorities to use in granting or
denying a developmental permit and the requirement that such petition
be registered or incur heavy penalities was attacked as being contrary
to the constitutional guarantees of due process. 228 Most importantly,
the proposed bill was viewed not only as a direct attack on private
property but also as seeking the elimination of the same. Moreover, the
229
bill was seen as threatening the loss of individual rights.
Supporters of the bill acknowledged that the bill lacked norms and
standards under which the proposed regulations could be developed or
enforced. They also recognized that the bill's goals were in direct
conflict with such private urban interests as real estate developers and
speculators, private financial and banking institutions, commercial and
industrial entrepreneurs and many individuals who felt that their perEcheverria and his plans regarding urban properties was surprisingly well sustained since
the president's powers are so complete and dominate all areas. The press exercises self
censorship and, because of governmental pressures, it has largely given up its duty as a
30, col. 1.
watchdog of politics. San Diego Evening Tribune, Dec. 3, 1971, § A, a't
225. Estudio del Lic. Ignacio Burgoa, in Los ASENTAMIENTOS HUMANOS, 57 (1976).
226. Id. at 59-62.
227. Estudio delLic. Felipe Tema Ramirez, in Los ASENTAMIENTOS HUMANOS, 72-76

(1976).
228. Id.
229. G. Fraga, El Projecto de Ley Sobre Asentamientos Humanos, Los ASENTAMIENTOS HUMANOS, 83-93 (1976).
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sonal rights would be seriously curtailed.23 0
The public debates became heated and biting with personal at-

tacks characterizing the opponents as "emissaries of the past" .2 3 1 As
the attacks multlipied, President Echeverria proceeded with plans for
two important conferences. In many ways the debates resembled the
controversies that surrounded President C~rdenas' socializing efforts
in the mid-thirties. Finally, the bill was amended to include some of
the changes that the opponents outlined and was approved in May of
1976.232

President Echeverria then headed the largest single delegation to
the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements in Vancouver,
Canada, and delivered a speech that focused attention on the urban
problems of developing and underdeveloped countries. 233 In addition,
in June of 1976 administration officials organized the National Seminar on the General Law on Human Settlements, which was held in the
town of Juridica, Quer~taro, and was attended by government officials
and urban specialists and representatives from the states. 23 4 Discussions centered upon industrial cities, city costs, creation of real estate
companies, municipal administration, development of medium sized
cities, the methodology of city planning, the recommendations of the
Vancouver Conference, the Law on Human Settlements, and other
urban legislation. 235
230. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, May, 1976, at 178-79.
231. Id. This phrase refers to colonial powers in Mexico's history. A report that
appeared in the Mexico City daily, El Excelsior, on April 24, 1976, illustrates its
sharpness. It reported that 2,600 hectares of the Cumbres de Monterrey National Park
had been illegally sold for luxury developments. One of them was in Chipinque, where
private business representatives met last month to organize the national campaign
against the human settlements bill. The opponents countered the effort by the President
to gain support for the bill in the newspaper El Dia in which the following quotation
appeared on April 8, 1976:
In 1928, the city hall made a gift of the land encompassed by the old colonial
ejido to those able to invest in homes or hotels as a way to promote tourism;
later, in 1932, when the President of the Republic visited the port and admired
its beauties, the State Governor expropriated all the land surrounding the bay
and in other choice places, as for example the Las Cruces plain, with the same
excuse of fostering tourism. Some of the land was given to the then Minister of
Communications and Public Works and Las Cruces was broken up into large
plots and distributed among the Governor's friends and favorites. In December
1946, a new President inauguarated his administration by expropriating some
ten ejido farms adjacent to the port, almost all of which were divided into 50hectare lots and sold at minimal prices to those favored by the Revolution. ...
Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, May, 1976, at 178-79.
232. The Law on Human Settlements, (Ley de Asentamientos Humanos) in Official
Daily of Mexico (DiarioOficial), May 26, 1976.
233. Comercio Exterior, supra note 125, Aug., 1976, at 284.
234. Id. at 287.
235. Id.
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A second major crisis occurred on August 31, 1976, when President Echeverria allowed the peso to float for the first time since
1954.236 The official rate of 12.50 per dollar quickly reached twenty
pesos. This sixty percent devaluation was the result of massive
inflation, extraordinary foreign borrowings, a rapid decline in productivity and exports, widespread unemployment and an inability to
237
continue to pay for the damaging balance of payments deficit.
Tourism, which ordinarily brings the largest amount of foreign exchange, declined precipitously because of Mexico's vote in the United
Nation's Resolution condemning Israel.238
Amid rumors that a military coup d'etat was imminent,industrialists, shopkeepers and office girls as well, stood in line to buy dollars
until the supply of dollars was nearly exhausted. The Bank of Mexico,
then, suspended all bank transactions of foreign currencies. 2 39 A new
wave of inflation, widespread hoarding, and labor demands for a 30%
wage increase prompted the government to abolish the 10% tax subsidy on exports and imposed new taxes on imports, particularly luxury
24
consumer goods. 0
Even though a tourist consuming goods or services in Mexico will
receive a bargain even after the peso stabilizes and even though there is
a price adjustment, the devaluation will not automatically boost the
economy. While Mexican goods will be cheaper on the world market,
still M6xico may not be able to increase their sales due to the lack of
private investment in factories and machinery. Government owned
enterprises do not seem to be able to compete successfully in the world
markets. 241 This gap may be filled by expanding the domestic market
through increases of spendable income in the hands of the poorer
segments of society.
Mexican consumers living in the border cities, found that their
purchasing power was cut in half. The continued fear of further
devaluations spurred a temporary but substantial increase in the sale of
Mexican products. United States businessmen in the border cities state
that the loss in sales is between 20% and 65%.242 President Echeverria
236. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 10, 1976, § I, at 1, col. 1.
237. Id.
238. Id. It is generally regarded that Echeverria's conduct has been a bid for Third
World support.
239. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 23, 1976, § I, at I, col. I.
240. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 10, 1976, § I, at 1, col. 1.
241. Id.
242. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 14, 1976, § I, at 40, col. 1.
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proclaimed that wages would be increased to 23% for the purpose of
compensating workers for the price increases that occurred after the
37% loss in purchasing power. 243 This move managed to avert a
threatened strike and protected civil servants and the army from this
loss. Nevertheless, without taking the loan to protect the floating peso
into consideration,
granted by the International Monetary Fund 2(IMF)
44
M6xico doubled, in pesos, its foreign debt.
While M6xico was still reeling from the impact of devaluation, a
third crisis occurred. On November 19, 1976, a few days before
President Echeverria's term of office was to expire, the President
expropriated 100,000 hectares which constituted approximately half of
the rich farm land in the Yaqui Valley of Sonora, M6xico. 245 This act
exacerbated the fears of landowners concerning massive expropriations and materially increased the already high hopes of agrarian
workers that land distribution would be widely practiced. 246 The President's decree charged that the land had been illegally held by seventytwo families in violation of the Agrarian Reform laws. The Ministry of
Agrarian Reform then proceeded to divide the land among 8,037 farm
workers dispensing an average of five hectares each .247
Previously, in January 1976, President Echeverria had ordered
Sonoran federal officials to investigate charges that the land was held
243. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 10, 1976, § I, at 1, col. 1.
244. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 20, 1976, § I, at 13, col. 1. The World Bank reports
that 11 countries, among 86 developing countries, account for 72% of all outstanding
debt to private financial institutions. In 1974, they were Argentina, Brazil, M6xico, Peri,
Greece, Israel, Spain, Korea, Malaysia, Algeria, and Zaire. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 27,
1976, § 1, at I, col. 1.
245. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 20, 1976, § 1, at 13, col. 1. The Yaqui Valley in
Sonora contains some of the best farm belt of Mexico and produces 50% of M6xico's wheat. San Diego Union, Dec. 1, 1976, § A, at 8 col. 1. This valley has been the
object of many farm worker demonstrations. A year before, 50,000 workers marched in
the streets of Ciudad Obreg6n, Sonora, to protest the lack of action on petitions to grant
land to ejidos from land allegedly exceeding the permissive limits. A delegation of Yaqui
landowners met with President Echeverria in Mixico City on Oct. 17, 1976, to resolve

the issue and President Echeverria met with the workers on a trip to Sonora on Oct. 20,
1976. On Nov. 18, 1976, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
Guillermo Romero, his assistant, and Celestino Salcedo Monte6n, a Mexicali Valley
farmer and a Baja California Senator, leader of the peasant land cause, landed by special
plane in the city. The next morning the workers took over the farms and the expropriat-

ing decree followed within hours. San Diego Union, Nov. 21, 1976, § A, at I, col. I.
246. Similar land invasions took place in various states, 40,000 hectares in Sinaloa,
Los Angeles Times, Dec. 15, 1976, § I, at 1, col. 1; 26,000 hectares in Durango also in the

states of Coahuila and Veracrtiz, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 30, 1976, § I, at 10, col. 1;
Los Angeles Times, Dec. 15, 1976, § I, at 1, col. I.
247. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 20, 1976, § I, at 13, col. 1.
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illegally. The land owners, however, had obtained injunctions, juicio
de amparo, to protect their land from the peasant and these injunctions
were in force at the time of the presidential expropriation. The landowners petitioned for their injunctive protection and sued the Mexican
government in the amount of 8,000,000 dollars in compensation for
the land, farm equipment, livestock, furnishings seized in the houses,
and supplies in out-buildings which were considered to be irretrievably
lost. 24 8 In Culiacin, Sinaloa landowners donated 8,800 irrigated hectares and 3,080 hectares of rich dry land for distribution by the federal
249
government in an attempt to prevent wholesale expropriations.
Mexican courts ordered a halt to the land distribution in Sonora
25 0
until the legality of the expropriated order could be determined.
Federal judge Carlos de Silva of Nava overturned former President
Echeverria's expropriation decree and ordered the land in Sonora
returned to their former owners. 251 This decision brought protests from
the peasants as they sought an appeal from the Mexican Supreme
Court .252

The new President, Jos6 L6pez Portillo, was sworn into his
position without incident.2 53 He initiated negotiations with the former
landowners and an agreement was finally approved nine months later
in August, 1977. The agreement provided that the indemnification
would pertain to only 17,660 hectares with the remaining 20,000
hectares to be considered as donations. 254 A total of 30,000,000 dollars
was pledged to be distributed at the rate of 680 dollars per acre while
the present price of irrigated land is about 884 dollars per acre. By the
end of 1977, only 80 of the 750 landowners had been paid. 255 In May,
1977, President L6pez Portillo acknowledged that the land seizures
had been illegal, but irrevocable nevertheless, because the families
248. San Diego Union, Nov. 21, 1976, § A, at 1, col. I. Many landowners and their
families fled into the United States as a result of sinister threats received by them.
Among the owners listed by the decree were two former governors, the family of a
former president, Alvaro Obreg6n, several United States citizens, and a large number of
very prominent families and political figures. San Diego Union, Nov. 20, 1976, § A, at 1,
col. I.
249. San Diego Union, Nov. 28, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 5.
250. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 15, 1976, § I, at 1, col. I.
251. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 13, 1976, § I, at 5, col. 1.
252. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 12, 1976, § I, at 1, col. 1. Most of the invading
peasants relinquished the land with only minor pockets of workers still remaining three
weeks after the initial possession.
253. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 3, 1976, § 1, at 25, col. 1.
254. Excelsior, Aug. 26, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 4.
255. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 4, 1977, § I, at 3, col. I. The owners felt that they
were being paid less than half of their actual land loss.
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who had settled on the land could not be removed without "setting the
country ablaze". 256
VI.

CONCLUSION

The realities in Mexico forces the acknowledgement that the
avoidance of "setting the country ablaze" is the most important
objective. For the past sixty years, the Revolutionary philosophy has
dominated most political and economic decisions. The ejido was
created to end a revolution, to give stability to the country, and to unify
the most discordant elements within the country. The ejido succeeds in
providing a future to landless farm workers only when the quality of
the land is high.2 57 It has been demonstrated that there is no real
prospect of distributing good land in the necessary quantities.
Nevertheless, there may be a partial solution to the plight of the
efidatarios and miniparcel farmers. Above all, appropriate reform of
CONASUPO must occur to provide an adequate income to these two
groups of farmers by changing the price support levels for farm
produce. Additionally, the newly unified agricultural bank (BANRURAL) can provide adequate levels of credit and, thus, prevent the
tendency to cover up deficiencies, through statistical confusion in the
actual farm credit allocated to these two groups. Reports on credit
available to other farmers, credits transferred to the national grain
producing company, and credits advanced to import food should be.
clearly designated as separate and distinct funds.
The president has all the necessary power to provide for the form
and use of land, and, through regulations, can affect the productivity
and net spendable income of farmers. Clearly, he has not used these
powers to benefit the ejidatarios directly with sufficient federal input
or technical assistance. The steady withdrawal from corn and wheat
production offers ample evidence that the policies of President
Echeverria further exacerbated the prolonged neglect and unrealistically postponed the resolution of agrarian issues. Instead, the presidential
powers were used to "temporarily" deny the aid that agriculture
required. Moreover, these powers were utilized to force the pace of
256. Id.
257. Excelsior, Aug. 26, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 4. The productivity of the Yaqui Valley
that was distributed in Nov., 1976, was not essentially harmed. It produced 4.1 tons per
hectare, with some ejidatarios producing five tons per hectare while the average harvest
in previous years was 4.7 tons per hectare. The total harvest was smaller because the
drought conditions limited the quantity of hectares under cultivation. Los Angeles
Times, Dec. 4, 1977, § 1, at 3, col. I.
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industrialization beyond M6xico's capacity to absorb, manage, subsidize and pay for.
Former President Echeverria's attempt to control and socialize the
urban centers went beyond acceptable perimeters framed by the Revolutionary philosophy and directly confronted the desires and selfinterest of large numbers of commercial, industrial, banking, realty
and agricultural segments of society that had been operating with
comparatively fewer controls. These groups considered this attempt as
a direct threat to their individual and property rights.
The debate that accompanied the Law on Human Settlements was
instrumental in creating a cohesion and singleness of purpose within
the business community which enabled them to respond decisively to
the land invasion. The debate was, in a sense, a rehearsal that provided
additional time to prepare, organize and take action. Evidence of
power and strength was necessary to convince the incoming president
the extent to which the business community would go. Similar pressures were brought to bear on the new administration by the peasants
and their leaders.
During the critical days after the peasant land invasions, which
were encouraged by former President Echeverria, pressures were exerted by both opposing groups. On November 24, 1976, only five days
after the expropriation decree, businessmen outside of the M6xico City
metropolitan area called a one-day general strike in which forty-five
cities in eleven northern states were virtually shut down. This strike
involved the entire northern sector of the country and ranged as far
south as Acapulco on the Pacific coast and Veracriz on the Caribbean.
This day of protest cost M6xico approximately 90,000,000 dollars. 258 About two weeks later,a large group of peasants announced
plans to march on foot and by bus to M6xico City to protest the
decision that rendered the expropriating decree illegal. The march was
also intended to press for favorable action on the peasant's petitions for
land in other parts of the country. 259 These techniques are traditional
expressions and are often used in political in-fighting to establish a
new political balance among contesting groups. The Revolutionary
philosophy dominates and permeates all facets of Mexican life. The
government with its long-lived political party, which had been successful in keeping all of these conflicting elements working together
since the revolutionary days, is sustained by this revolutionary philoso258. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 25, 1976, § I, at 1, col. 5.
259. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 14, 1976, § 1, at 14, col. 1.
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phy. Both these groups, the businessmen and the peasants, shall
ultimately influence what Mexico can and must do to satisfy its people.
The economic burdens felt by a large proportion of ejidatarios and
other agricultural workers is so oppressive that new mechanisms must
be found that will provide the benefits promised by the agrarian
reform.
The conciliatory tone of President L6pez Portillo has been
evidenced from the very beginning of his administration. He has
sought to bring unity among the various interest groups that were
alienated by former President Echeverria. The new president signed an
agreement on December 10, 1976, with 140 large companies to
coordinate their investment plan with the aim of creating 300,000 jobs.
This accord symbolized the end of a five-year investment slowdown by
the private sector that was initiated to protest against the Echeverrian
administration policies.26 The land expropriation and distribution in
Sonora is merely a partial solution and by no means the final resolution
to the underlying causes of unrest. Similarly, a judicial decision on the
legality of the presidential expropriating decree does not afford a
permanent nor even a partial solution. It is not a legal question because
both sides may point to the inherently contradictory constitutional
provisions and both sides are correct in claiming that these provisions
protect them. A juridical decision based upon the individual facts of
each case would not satisfy either group. Therefore, it becomes purely
a political question and only political pressures and counterpressures
as exerted by various groups can hope to bring about the necessary
accommodations as evidence by the August, 1977, compromise between President L6pez Portillo and the Sonoran landowners.
The contradictions inherent in article 27 of the Constitution remain and shall surely spring forth when the economic conditions
among the millions of farm workers who cannot subsist on the official
wage levels compell such emergence. 26 1 Yet, an encouraging development is now apparent and promises to become increasingly more
important to Mexico. There are proven oil reserves amounting to
14,000,000,000 barrels of oil while foreign experts estimate that there
is probably more than 60,000,000,000 barrels of oil in reserves. 262
Petroleum income is expected to reach 1,200,000,000 dollars this
260. N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1976, § I, at 17, col. 3.
261. The wage level in Sinaloa in December, 1976, was 85 pesos per day. Los
Angeles Times, Dec. 15, 1976, § I, at 1, col. 1. In December, 1977, the daily wage was 94

pesos. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 4, 1977, § I, at 3, col. 1.
262. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 2, 1977, § I, at 11, col. i.
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year. This income is in addition to the income that will be derived from
the massive 3,000,000,000 dollar investment loan of the projected
development of new oil and gas fields and the building of extensive gas
pipelines for carrying gas to the major population centers. Moreover,
such gas is intended for export to the United States. 26 3 The question
remains as to whether the time gained, by the use of these revenues
from oil, will be properly utilized to solve the job, education, health,
housing and transportation needs of the rural communities.
Echeverria's legacy will endure for many years. His conduct of
the nation's economy parralleled Cirdenas, but created an opposite
result. While C6.rdenas' policies ended the unrest and brought about a
unity of purpose, Echeverria's brought two powerful groups into
conflict and kept them at odds with one another throughout his administration. The neglect, and even more, the manipulation of the agricultural sector to serve the needs of the country, as perceived by President
Echeverria, produced incalculable harm to the peasants. His government owned industrialization policy compounded the heavy burdens
that Mexico as a developing country must bear. Certainly the need to
industrialize and compete in world markets is necessary, yet the cost to
the farm and urban worker is, perhaps at this time, too high a price to
pay. The result of Echeverria's policies shattered the trust of the
Mexican people in their carefully nurtured political. balance, eroding
confidence in their institutions and political forums. Mexico's only
hope for economic progress now lies in President L6pez Portillo's
ability to recreate and nourish an equitable political balance that will
provide a just solution for the farm and urban worker's present intolerable situation.
HarrietR. Stone
263.

Wall Street Journal, Aug. 8, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
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